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Abstract: Im Zentrum von Vallas Umgestaltung der Dialektik als
rhetorischer Methode steht ein neues Verständnis von certum, das aus
Quintilians Institutio oratoria stammt. Diesem Verständnis zufolge ist
Gewissheit in dem begründet, was allgemein akzeptiert wird, nicht
in dem, was wahr ist. Damit trennt Valla certum und verum. In den
Dialecticae disputationes stellt er Dialektik nicht als eine logische oder
philosophische Methode zum Beweis von Wahrheiten dar, sondern
als Praxis Geständnisse herbeizuführen und als juristische Produktion
konsensueller Gewissheiten. Auch in anderen Werken, etwa den
Elegantiae und seinem Kommentar zu Quintilians Institutio, verbindet
er durchweg certum mit Konsens, insbesondere Konsens im Sinne der
rhetorischen Strategie der status-Theorie.
Keywords: Valla, Quintilian, argumentation, proof, certainty,
dialectic
V
arious studies have illustrated Lorenzo Valla’s extensive use
of rhetorical concepts and texts in his critical approach to
scholasticism, so it is by this point uncontroversial to
argue that this pugnacious humanist engaged in the “rhetoriciza-
tion of dialectic.”1 Also uncontroversial is Valla’s particular reliance
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on Quintilian for these reformations, both as a matter of a long-
standing preference for this ancient schoolmaster’s thought as well
as a matter of the history of the humanist re-discovery of the texts
of antiquity.2 For even if the famous papal secretary-cum-book
hunter Poggio Bracciolini recovered a complete manuscript of
Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria at the monastery of St. Gall in 1416,
Valla rather than Poggio himself took up the task of editing the
damaged text later in the century.3 It is not surprising, then, that
Quintilian’s Institutio, within arm’s reach, should exert a special
influence on Valla, and even an influence in works that might seem
outside the obvious applicability of an oratorical textbook.
Rather than argue yet again that Quintilian was influential in
Valla’s thinking or evenmore particularly in his efforts to “rhetoricize”
dialectic, I turn in this discussion to the vocabulary that Valla uses in
these efforts and how this vocabulary stems from his interactions with
Quintilian’s writings. More exactly, Valla relies on an ancient under-
standing of certainty—the quality of being certum—in his reorientation
of dialectic around the strategies and terminology of the rhetorical tra-
dition. This ancient version of certainty, which signifies a kind of con-
sensus rather than the scientific objectivity denoted by the modern
term of the same name, traces its rhetorical formulation to the writings
of Quintilian. By turning to Valla’s manuscript edition of the Institutio
and his marginal annotations, one sees how this humanist author was
Valla: The Primacy of Rhetoric and the De-Moralization of History,” History and Theory
12:4 (1973): 389–404; and L. Jardine, “Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of
Humanist Dialectic,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 15:2 (1977): 143–164. For a discus-
sion of Valla’s preference for rhetoric over dialectic, especially in the context of later
humanist thinking, see L. Nauta, “Anti-Essentialism and the Rhetoricization of
Knowledge: Mario Nizolio’s Humanist Attack on Universals,” Renaissance Quarterly 65:1
(2012): 31–66.
2For an account of Valla’s preference for Quintilian over Cicero and the assess-
ment of Quintilian among some of his humanist contemporaries, see C. J. Classen,
“Quintilian and the Revival of Learning in Italy,” Humanistica Lovaniensia 43 (1994):
77–98; and L. Cesarini Martinelli, “Le Postille di Lorenzo Valla all’ “Institutio orato-
ria” di Quintiliano,” in Ottavio Besomi and Mariangela Regoliosi, eds., Lorenzo Valla
e l’Umanesimo Italiano (Padova: Antenore, 1986), 21–50. In his letters, too, Valla writes
that he is “the man who composed a Commentary on Cicero and Quintilian in which
I exalted Quintilian above Cicero, Demosthenes, and Homer himself” (L. Valla,
Correspondence, ed. and trans. B. Cook (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2013), 110).
3Poggio, too, explains in a letter to Guarinus Veronensis that Quintilian “seems
in my judgment to be perfect in both the highest theory and the most distinguished
practice of oratory. From this man alone we could learn the perfect method of public
speaking, even if we did not have Cicero, the father of Roman oratory” (P. Gordon,
Two Renaissance Book Hunters: The Letters of Poggius Bracciolini to Nicolaus de Niccolis
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 193–194).
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eager to follow his ancient predecessor in understanding the meaning
of certum through the lens of forensic persuasion rather than philo-
sophical truth as such. This rhetorical orientation of certainty persists
in Valla’s Elegantiae, too, and throughout his Dialecticae disputationes,
where Valla leverages Quintilian’s peculiar understanding of certainty
in his efforts to reform the modal logic of scholasticism. By concentrat-
ing on Valla’s deliberate use of this term, this study aims to reinforce
the scholarly understanding of Valla’s rhetorical frame and to provide
a historical antecedent to his writings that insist upon the separation of
truth and certainty.4
This lexical study proceeds in three parts. First, Valla’s marginal
annotations in his manuscript edition of the Institutio reveal how
Valla adopts Quintilian’s understanding that certum denotes a kind
of consensus, and in particular one of a legal nature. Second, this
notion of certainty as a kind of forensic agreement reappears in
Valla’s Dialecticae disputationes, where the association of certum
with courtroom confession cements this concept’s rhetorical orien-
tation and illustrates its function in reimagining dialectic as a pro-
cess of crafting agreement rather than one of purely logical proof.
Finally, Valla’s discussions of the conventional basis of the law—
discussions that stretch across several writings—illustrate his view
of the complex interactions between the veritas of rational discourse
and the certitudo of rhetorical persuasion.
I. QUINTILIAN AS A SOURCE OF CERTAINTY
According to the notes on the final page of his manuscript, Valla
likely completed editing the text of the Institutio in December of 1444.5
Although Valla had access to substantial portions of Quintilian’s
text before his editorial work on Poggio’s discovered manuscript,
this later, complete edition is remarkable for Valla’s extensivemarginal
4For a helpful treatment of certainty in Valla’s Dialecticae disputationes and
Quintilian’s influence on Valla’s thinking, see L. Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense:
Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2009), 233–234. I expand here on Nauta’s account of “Valla’s central
idea [that] all our speaking and arguing should be ruled by custom and convention,”
and I argue furthermore that Valla’s debt to Quintilian manifests in a specialized set
of vocabulary—including certum and associated terms—in many of his writings, not
only in the Disputationes.
5Laurentius Valla hunc codicem sibi emendavit ipse anno millesimo quadringentesimo qua-
dragesimo quarto mense decembri die nono (L. Cesarini Martinelli and A. Perosa, Le Postille
all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano: Edizione Critica (Padova: Antenore, 1996), xii).
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commentary, notes that provide some access to Valla’s thinking
about this influential ancient source.6 As with the rest of Valla’s
edition, the fifth book of Quintilian’s text is brimming with mar-
ginal notes, and alongside Book 5’s technical discussion of the vari-
eties of arguments—enthymemes, epicheiremes, entechnical proofs,
and so forth—these explanatory annotations are especially useful.
In this book, too, we find annotations that reveal the humanist’s
understanding of certainty, of what it means to be certum.
Before directing my attention to Valla’s notes themselves, how-
ever, I turn first to one key passage of Quintilian’s text where the
ancient teacher of rhetoric considers the meaning of certum within a
larger discussion about the “nature of all arguments” (natura omnium
argumentorum, 5.10.8). In a succinct definition of argumentation,
Quintilian explains that “reasoning lends credence to matters of doubt
(dubia) through things which are certain (certa),” and since he has
placed “certainty” at the very heart of his notion of what arguments
do, Quintilian specifies shortly thereafter how one ought to under-
stand this central term7:
Now we regard as certa things perceived by the senses, for example
what we see or hear (signs come under this head); things about which
common opinion is unanimous: the existence of gods, the duty of
respecting parents; provisions of laws; what has been accepted as
moral custom, if not in the belief of all mankind, at least in that of a city
or nation where the case is being pleaded—many matters of right, for
example, involve custom rather than laws; whatever is agreed upon
between both parties; whatever has been proved; lastly, whatever is
not contradicted by our opponent.8
6Portions of Quintilian’s text were available before Poggio’s discovery, including the
passages from Books 2, 3, and 5 discussed in this article. For a history of manuscripts of
Quintilian’s text, see M. Winterbottom, “Fifteenth-Century Manuscripts of Quintilian,”
The Classical Quarterly (New Series) 17 (1967): 339–369. The manuscript of the Institutio
was well regarded not merely for its textual emendations but also for Valla’s marginal
notes: Winterbottom explains that “the name and fame of Lorenzo Valla gave his manu-
script a large and swift progeny” and lists a selection of later editions that emerged from
Valla’s editorial work (p. 361–363). In fact, Valla’s notes on the first two books of the
Institutio were included in a Venetian printed edition of Quintilian’s work in 1494, deca-
des after Valla’s death (J. E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, 3 vols.
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 2:67).
7Ratio per ea quae certa sunt fidem dubiis adferens: quae natura est omnium argumento-
rum, 5.10.8. Translations of Quintilian’s text are adapted from The Orator’s Education,
ed. and trans. D. A. Russell, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
8Pro certis autem habemus primum quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae videmus audi-
mus, qualia sunt signa, deinde ea in quae communi opinione consensum est: “deos esse,”
“praestandam pietatem parentibus,” praeterea quae legibus cauta sunt, quae persuasione
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This litany of certainties can be divided into three categories. First,
Quintilian turns his attention to matters of sense perception, “what
we see or hear,” a definition that likely stems from the idea of “discern-
ing” represented by the Latin verb cernere. Its past participle cretum is
merely one transposition away from the adjective under discussion
here, and ancient authors seem to acknowledge this etymological con-
nection in several works.9 As a second category—and surely second-
ary in importance—Quintilian briefly points to matters that have
been previously proven, quid probatum est. But third andmost emphat-
ically, Quintilian defines “certainty” as matters of agreement, whether
most broadly as beliefs for which “common opinion is unanimous,” or
in the more limited case of city-wide laws or even the particular agree-
ments between two parties in a courtroom. Indeed, Quintilian’s list of
certa is largely framed in the concerns and terminology of forensic rhet-
oric: inter utramque partem and adversarius both remind readers that the
arguments and certainties under discussion are legal in their nature.
But even so, we might summarize Quintilian’s understanding of cer-
tum not as any particular law or custom but rather as the more general
concept of consensum, a word he himself uses in this catalog.
This understanding of certum as consensus or agreement seems to
capture Valla’s attention if his marginal annotation can be seen as even
a rough indication of his understanding of the original text. Alongside
Quintilian’s discussion of various certa, Valla inserts a paragraph from
the JustinianDigest, where the imperial jurist Julianus draws a distinc-
tion between laws that are formally enacted through votes and those
that are enacted by a people’s “very deeds and actions”10:
etiam si non omnium hominum, eius tamen civitatis aut gentis in qua res agitur in mores
recepta sunt, ut pleraque in iure non legibus sed moribus constant: si quid inter utramque
partem convenit, si quid probatum est, denique cuicumque adversarius non contradicit,
5.10.12–13.
9One might consider Ennius’ well-known fragment amicus certus in re incerta cer-
nitur (351, Jocelyn) as an early example of wordplay surrounding cernere and certum.
For further examples of certum as a word rooted in concerns of sense perception, see
TLL vol. III 915, 45sqq. In Leviathan (2.27), too, Thomas Hobbes explains that the Latin
noun crimen is derived from “Cerno, which signifies to perceive,” and that such a cri-
men denotes “onely such sinnes, as may be made appear before a Judge . . . [and]
not meer Intentions” (ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), 2:454).
10Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa write that “the discipline most persistently investi-
gated in the marginal comments of Quintilian in each case is the law: Valla has stripped
the Corpus iuris (and the Sententiae of Paulus) looking for evidence pertaining to the legal
situations described by the orator” (Le Postille all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited
in n. 5 above, p. lxxxi). For a discussion of Valla’s approach to study of the law and his
place among other Renaissance jurists, see D. Kelley, “The Rise of Legal History in the
Renaissance,” History and Theory 9:2 (1970): 174–194.
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Long-standing custom (consuetudo) is observed in the place of law with
good reason, and this is the law which is said to be settled by customs
(moribus constitutum). For as these laws in particular restrain us for no
other reason than because they are accepted by the judgment of the
public, those things which the populace approved without any written
law justly restrain all men: for what difference is there whether the
populace declares its will by vote or by its very deeds and actions? It
is understood most correctly, therefore, that laws may be abolished
not only by the vote of the proposer of a law but also by the silent
agreement of all people through disuse (tacito consensu omnium per
desuetudinem).11
Notably, Valla does not point to an ancient discussion of sense percep-
tion as a helpful comparison or etymological clarification of
Quintilian’s definition. Rather, just as Quintilian himself points to cus-
toms and laws as examples of certainties, Valla preserves this forensic
orientation in juxtaposing the notion of certumwith the consuetudo and
“very deeds and actions” of a community—that is, Valla associates
common practices rather than “discerning” with certainty. This
emphasis on consuetudo extends to the end of Valla’s citation, too,
where Julianus sees that laws can be overturned “by the silent agree-
ment (tacito consensu) of all through disuse (desuetudo),” where such
“disuse” emerges through the common beliefs or practices of the
many.12 And perhaps even more notable than Valla’s drawing out
the theme of customary law is his repeated citation of words that
include the Latin prefix con-: consuetudo, constitutum, consensus. By citing
11Inveterata consuetudo pro lege non immerito custoditur, et hoc est ius quod dicitur
moribus constitutum. Nam cum ipse leges nulla alia ex causa [nos teneant,] quam quod iudi-
cio populi recepte sunt, merito et ea, que sine ullo scripto populus [probavit], tenebunt omnes:
nam quid interest utrum suffragio populus voluntatem suam declaret an rebus ipsis et factis?
Quare rectissime et illud receptum est, ut leges non solum suffragio legis latoris, sed etiam
tacito consensu omnium per desuetudinem abrogentur, 1, 3, 32, 1. Valla’s marginal note
does not include nos teneant after causa, but modern editions of the Digest include
these two words. I have changed probabit to the perfect tense verb that appears in
Julianus’ text. Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa do not comment on these textual diffe-
rences in their edition of Valla’s marginal notes (cited in n. 5 above, p. 105).
12For Valla’s link between utor and consuetudo, see his discussion at Elegantiae
5.5. Text of the Elegantiae and section numbers are taken from De linguae latinae
elegantia, ed. S. L. Moreda, 2 vols. (Cáceres: Universidad de Extremadura, 1999).
Unless noted otherwise, the numbering scheme of Moreda’s critical edition matches
that provided in the more widely available Opera omnia, ed. E. Garin, 2 vols.
(Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1962). For Valla’s debt to Quintilian for his understanding
of consuetudo, see M. J. H. Pareja “Quintiliano en las Elegancias de Lorenzo Valla,” in
T. Albaladejo, E. del Río, J. A. Caballero, eds., Quintiliano, historia y actualidad de la
retórica: actas del Congreso Quintiliano (Calahorra: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos,
1998), 1363–1372.
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an ancient text that highlights Quintilian’s own allusion to consensus and
that draws out several other words that denote a “togetherness” of
some kind or another, Valla underscores the role of agreement in the
Institutio’s original discussion. Both as a matter of subject—the custom-
ary habits of a group of people—and as amatter of lexical patterns, then,
Valla suggests that he follows Quintilian in understanding certainty as a
brand of agreement, and principally one of a legal orientation.
One sees in Valla’s other writings, too, how this humanist
reformer understands the concept of certainty with reference to
the writings of Quintilian and how he maintains the association of
certainty and consensus, even outside the immediate context of
the Institutio’s rhetorical interests. One example of this association
can be found in Valla’s most direct philological study of classical
Latin vocabulary, his influential De linguae latinae elegantia (or
Elegantiae), a 1441 handbook of language and style that aims to
return to those exemplary authors of antiquity who were the “most
devoted to speaking well.”13 As an admirer of the prose of Cicero
and especially Quintilian, Valla wrote these six volumes of learned
stylistic recommendations to mitigate what he viewed as a decline
and corruption of the purity of the Latin tongue.14
Valla treats a variety of words and phrases in the Elegantiae, where
he prescribes correct sense and syntax usually by referencing model
sentences from classical sources, and following this strategy, Valla
looks to Quintilian to clarify the meaning of the phrase certum est:
13Valla includes among those “most devoted to speaking well” (bene loquendi stu-
diosissimi) not only orators and jurists but also philosophers and writers (1.pr). For a
description of the methods of the Elegantiae, especially as the work compares with
grammatical works of antiquity and his own era, see D. Marsh “Grammar, Method,
and Polemic in Lorenzo Valla’s Elegantiae,” Rinascimento 19 (1979), 91–116. For a more
recent study on the predecessors and influence of the Elegantiae, see A. Moss,
Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), 35–63. For an account of Valla’s philological methods outside this lexicograph-
ical work, see S. Camporeale, “Lorenzo Valla’s Oratio on the Pseudo-Donation of
Constantine: Dissent and Innovation in Early Renaissance Humanism,” Journal of
the History of Ideas 57:1 (1996): 9–26. For studies of the novelty and influence of
Valla’s Elegantiae, see W. K. Percival, Studies in Renaissance Grammar (Burlington:
Ashgate, 2004), 75. Translations of Valla’s Elegantiae are my own.
14For Valla, the decrepitude of the Latin language mirrors the decrepitude of the
city of Rome itself: “Everything has been overthrown, everything has been burned
down, everthing has been ruined, so that hardly the Capitoline hill remains. And
accordingly, for many centuries, not only has no one spoken Latin, but no one has
even understood how to read it” (Omnia everta, incensa, diruta, ut vix Capitolina supersit
arx. Siquidem multi iam saeculis non modo Latine nemo locutus est, sed ne Latina quidem
legens intellexit, 1.pr).
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certum est is not just understood as “it is obvious” (manifestum est), as
Quintilian does here: “Truly, it is certum that there is a law that one
may kill an adulterer.” But it is also understood as “it is carefully consid-
ered” (deliberatum est) or “it is settled” (constitutum est). In the second
case, a dative with an infinitive is usually attached to the phrase, as in
“it is certum for me to go into Spain.” Sometimes the dative is merely
implied, as is the case in Vergil: “it is certum that it is preferable to suffer
in the forest, among the dens of beasts” . . . that is, it is certum to me.15
Valla advances two primary understandings of this adjective. First, he
links what is certain to what is “obvious” or “manifest” (manifestum),
quickly turning to the authority of Quintilian as a source for this first
definition. One might also see the first position of manifestum in
Valla’s explanation as a sign of his awareness of this Latin adjective’s
etymological origins in the vocabulary of perception, a word history
that Quintilian himself foregrounds in his discussion of certainty in
the Institutio.16 But the quality of being “manifest” figures prominently
in legal texts as well, and Valla’s swift turn to his preferred ancient
source of rhetorical theory immediately grounds his investigation of
manifestum in the world of forensic strategy rather than mere “discern-
ing.”17 Even if Valla had Book 5 of the Institutio and its detailed inves-
tigation of certainty at his fingertips, in fact, he nevertheless eschews
this more direct treatment of certum in the Elegantiae and instead turns
to an earlier passage of Quintilian’s handbook.18 In his lexicographical
study here, Valla cites Book 3 of the Institutio and its discussion of
status theory, and in this context of rhetorical invention, not in the
more explicit discussion of certainty two books later, do we find the
15certum est non modo accipitur pro manifestum est, ut Quintilianus: Nempe legem esse
certum est; sed etiam pro deliberatum et constitutum est. In quo secundo plerumque adiungitur
dativus cum infinitivo; ut, certum est mihi ire in Hispaniam. Nonnumquam dativus
subintelligitur, ut apud Vergilium: Certum est in sylvis, inter spelaea ferarum malle pati . . .
Id est mihi, 5.27.
16Several Latin authors use manifestum in this sense of “visible” or “conspicu-
ous,” (OLD manifestus 4, 5, 6 and TLL vol. VIII 308, 39sqq.). Compare Quintilian’s quae
sensibus percipiuntur, 5.10.12.
17Manifestum was originally relevant to evidence in criminal cases, and appea-
rances of manifestum in Plautus often describe those who are caught red-handed.
For a number of examples of this understanding of the adjective in its criminal orien-
tation, see TLL vol. VIII 307, 84sqq. and VIII 310, 8sq. For a discussion of the impor-
tance of forensic language to Roman comedic texts more generally, see A. Scafuro,
The Forensic Stage: Settling Disputes in Graeco-Roman New Comedy (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 25–67.
18Valla had access to incomplete manuscripts of the Institutio in 1441, the year he
completed writing his Elegantiae, and the tenth chapter of Book 5 was likely available
to him before Poggio’s discovery in 1416 (Winterbottom, “Fifteenth-Century
Manuscripts of Quintilian,” cited in n. 6 above, p. 339).
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Elegantiae’s quotation: “it is certum that there is a law that one may kill
an adulterer.”19
Orators, so Quintilian recommends in this earlier book, should
refine the issue of their legal disputes by turning to the triad of ques-
tions at the heart of this Hellenistic rhetorical framework: whether
something happened, what happened, and what kind of thing it
was.20 As part of Book 3’s long survey of the components of status the-
ory, its various formulations, and its several practitioners, Quintilian
provides as a hypothetical case of its usefulness the example later refe-
renced in Valla’s Elegantiae. In this scenario, a man accused of murder
may defend himself by arguing that the murder victim was an adul-
terer, for Quintilian reminds his readers that it is “certain” that the
law permits one to kill such a criminal:
Let us suppose the charge made by the accuser is “You killed the man.”
If the defendant denies it, it is he who produces the issue. But suppose
he admits (confitetur) the fact, but says the adulterer was justifiably kil-
led by him. (Truly, it is certum that there is a law that one may kill an
adulterer.) Unless the accuser makes some reply, there is no case.21
While the accused admits what he has done—he agrees that he has kil-
led another man—he denies the action was unjustified on account of
the victim’s adulterous behavior. In other words, while the two parties
of this case provide the same answers to the first two status questions
of whether something happened and what that something was, they
disagree on the answer to the third regarding the circumstances sur-
rounding the crime. What the prosecution calls cold-blooded murder,
19Status theory is a rhetorical framework where parties in a forensic dispute
come to “a standing still” (that is, a status) in their arguments. For a brief study of
the technique of status theory (also called stasis theory), see O. A. L. Dieter,
“Stasis,” Speech Monographs 17 (1950): 345–369. For a more recent account of status
theory especially as it figures in the educational program of Quintilian’s text, see
E. Fantham, Roman Readings: Roman Response to Greek Literature from Plautus to
Statius and Quintilian (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011): 320–330. For a history of the develop-
ment of status theory, see R. Nadeau, “Classical Systems of Stases in Greek:
Hermagoras to Hermogenes,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 2 (1959), 52–71.
20For Hermagoras’ original formulation of four status questions including the
final question of “objection,” see Nadeau, “Classical Systems of Stases in Greek:
Hermagoras to Hermogenes,” cited in n. 19 above, p. 53–54. Nadeau also writes that
later Latin authors, including Cicero and Quintilian, consider the three questions lis-
ted here to be sufficient (p. 54).
21Sit enim accusatoris intentio: ‘hominem occidisti’; si negat reus, faciet statum qui
negat. Quid si confitetur, sed iure a se adulterum dicit occisum (nempe legem esse certum
est quae permittat)? Nisi aliquid accusator respondet, nulla lis est, 3.6.17. In the
Elegantiae, Valla omits the relative clause quae permittit in Quintilian’s parenthetical
statement.
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the defendant calls a justifiable and even legally permissible homicide.
Quintilian posits that since it is certum that the law allows one to kill
adulterers, there can be no disagreement about whether the defendant
acted within his legal rights if his claims about infidelity are correct.
But “if the prosecutor says, ‘He who was killed was not an adulterer,’
then the rebuttal of the charge is now the prosecutor’s business, and he
will produce the status.”22 This status, or point of “standing still,” arises
from the disagreement between prosecution and defendant about the
circumstances of the murder and the kind of homicide that occurred.
Valla’s coupling ofmanifestumwithQuintilian’s explanation of sta-
tus theory anticipates the Elegantiae’s second definition of certum as
what is constitutum, an adjective that also recalls the terminology of
this long-standing strategy of rhetorical invention. Even if Quintilian
himself generally uses the Latin term status to denote the point of
“standing still” or the issue of a forensic dispute, Cicero and the author
of the Rhetorica ad Herennium both prefer constitutio.23 The Rhetorica ad
Herennium, for example, uses constitutio to denote a “synthesis, a con-
junction, co-stasis, or ‘standing together’ of specific statements, or
declarations, betweenwhich there is an interval of conflict, or disagree-
ment.”24 And in his De inventione, Cicero notes that a constitutio is the
“original clash, or primary conflict of causes.”25 In one sense, this
constitutio is a distillation of difference; in another sense, however, it
also denotes a moment when parties push against each other or col-
lide. The term with its now-familiar con- prefix suggests a meeting,
but here a meeting of competitors or adversaries rather than of allies.
Taken together, Valla’s marginal commentary at the Institutio’s
definition of certum and his own discussion of this word’s meaning
in the Elegantiae sketch a broad but consistent understanding of cer-
tainty. His earlier lexicographical discussion points to legal procedure
and the “standing together” of status theory in anticipation of his later
writings in the margins of Quintilian’s text. There, Valla eschews the
sensory understanding of certainty for one rooted in legal convention
and consensus. Keeping in mind this notion of certainty as agreement,
I now turn to Valla’s attempts to reformulate dialectic and logic in his
Dialecticae disputationes. Long understood to incorporate rhetorical
22Non fuit’ inquit ‘adulter’: ergo depulsio incipit esse actoris, ille statum faciet, 3.6.17.
23In one discussion of status at 3.6.2, Quintilian explicitly notes his preference for
the Latin term status over constitutio in discussions of locating the issue of a forensic
dispute. The word constitutio appears only four times in the Institutio.
24Dieter, “Stasis,” cited in n. 19 above, p. 359.
25See De Inventione 1.10 and Dieter, cited in n. 19 above, p. 364–365. For further
references to constitutio as the “formulation of the point at issue in a case,” see OLD 7a
and TLL vol. IV 526, 65sqq.
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elements fromQuintilian’s manual, theDisputationes shows how Valla
again understands certum through the lens of forensic argument and
how—by situating this particular adjective at the center of his reform
of modal logic—he leverages certainty in this effort to “rhetoricize”
the technical methods of scholasticism.
II. LEGAL CERTAINTY IN VALLA’S HUMANIST DIALECTIC
Sometimes called the Repastinatio, a “retilling” of scholastic philos-
ophy, Valla’s Dialecticae disputationes aims to prune back the over-
grown terminology of argumentation and proof. This work takes
upon itself to redefine what practicing philosophy fundamentally
means, but even if Valla’s project in the Disputationes is more directly
philosophical than that in the Elegantiae or in his commentary on the
Institutio, he nevertheless illustrates his fondness for Quintilian
throughout this work.26 Valla recommends that philosophy and dia-
lectic look to his preferred model from antiquity to replace Aristotle
and the methods proposed by his scholastic followers. In the work’s
first chapter, which brims with Aristotelian predicables and transcen-
dentals, Valla asks himself, “in translating these terms, whom should
I follow but Quintilian?”27 And Valla’s insertion of Quintilian’s
thought into the Aristotelian system of logical argumentation was, in
some sense, a literal one. In the second book of the Disputationes
(2.21–23), Valla merely copies much of the second half of Book 5 of
the Institutio word for word in lieu of a discussion or even paraphrase
26For a discussion of Valla’s reorientation of the study of philosophy, see C. S.
Celenza, “Lorenzo Valla and the Traditions and Transmissions of Philosophy,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 66:4 (2005): 483–506; and L. Nauta, “Lorenzo Valla and
the Rise of Humanist Dialectic,” in J. Hankins, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 193–210. For
a specific example of Valla’s efforts to use rhetorical strategies and sources to refor-
mulate topics of scholastic theology, see C. E. Trinkaus, “Lorenzo Valla on the
Problem of Speaking About the Trinity,” Journal of the History of Ideas 57:1 (1996):
27–53. For a treatment of the Disputationes as “a classic example of negative dialectic
[or] of a mode of writing and analysis which is focused not so much on constructing a
new system as it is in dismantling an older one,” see W. S. Blanchard, “The Negative
Dialectic of Lorenzo Valla: A Study in the Pathology of Opposition,” Renaissance
Studies 14:2 (2000): 149–189.
27In quorum translatione quem potius quam Quintilianum sequar?, 1.1.6. Translations
of Valla’s Disputationes are adapted from Dialectical Disputations, ed. and trans. B.
Copenhaver and L. Nauta (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
Numbering of chapters and sections of Valla’s Disputationes is taken from the same
edition.
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of Quintilian’s work.28 He justifies this transplanting by appealing to
Quintilian’s unparalleled talents: “no one—unless Godwere ‘someone,’
so to speak—can say anything that has the mighty genius and elo-
quence of Quintilian’s language.”29 This selection includes Quintilian’s
chapters on technical proof (De probatione artificiali, 5.8), signs (De signis,
5.9), and arguments (De argumentis, 5.10), the last of which includes his
investigation of certum discussed earlier in this article.
In theDisputationes, however, Valla’s interest in certum and its role
in forensic argument extends well beyond these direct citations of the
Institutio. Following Quintilian, in fact, Valla turns to the vocabulary
of certainty in his definition of modal arguments in the second book
of the Disputationes: “every proof is produced through truths that are
certum, and through them, that very truth (veritas) causes some other
truth (verum), which was incertum, to be seen as certum.”30 We imme-
diately notice two key differences between Valla’s definition of proof
here and Quintilian’s definition of the “nature of all arguments” in
Book 5 of the Institutio. First, Valla concerns himself with the verum,
not merely the certum, as it is revealed through argumentation.
Whereas Quintilian writes that it “is the nature of all arguments that
nothing is shown to be certain by what is uncertain,” Valla here inclu-
des additional concerns for “the very truth” of arguments, concerns
that appear to be absent from his ancient source.31 Second and more
28This selection includes Institutio 5.8.1 to 5.10.125, a full thirty-one pages of
Latin in the most recent I Tatti edition. The earliest editions of Valla’s Disputationes
were written before Valla’s acquisition of Quintilian’s text in 1443 and in fact already
included these portions of the Institutio. The version of the Disputationes which Valla
was still revising at the time of his death in 1457 serves as the basis of the latest edi-
tion from I Tatti (Copenhaver and Nauta, Dialectical Disputations, cited in n. 27 above,
p. 2:498–499).
29neminem neque ea ingenii vi neque ea eloquentia posse quicquam dicere—nisi Deus
aliquis, ut sic dicam, foret—qua Quintilianus dixit, 2.20.1–2.
30probatio omnis fit per vera quae certa sunt, facitque per haec ipsa veritas aliud quod-
dam verum videri certum quod erat incertum, 2.19.22. Alan Perreiah’s recent study of
Valla’s approach to language asserts that “Valla conflates truth with certainty”
(Renaissance Truths: Humanism, Scholasticism, and the Search for the Perfect Language
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 70). While these two terms are closely related, however,
Valla does not fuse them entirely: as he shows here, what is verum can nevertheless
remain incertum. For Valla there was likely not an important distinction between veri-
tas and verum since “substantive nouns like ‘falsity’ and ‘truth’ do not have a different
signification from their corresponding adjectives” (Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense,
cited in n. 4 above, p. 67–68).
31Valla’s understanding of truth continues to inspire scholarly debate. C. Trinkaus
argues that for Valla “truth and knowledge are . . . what an individual thinks they are”
(The Scope of Renaissance Humanism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983),
151). Peter Mack, taking an opposite view, argues that Valla understands that “language
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central to the present discussion, Valla omits any catalog of what
qualifies as “certain”—a stark contrast with Quintilian’s extensive
list—and leaves his readers without an obvious definition of what this
central term might even mean.
Before excavating Valla’s understanding of certainty itself, we first
investigate the reason for his interest in the verum. Underlying Valla’s
preoccupation with the truth is his dismantling of the tradition of
Aristotelian modal propositions. Valla’s critique of such modality is
two-fold: first he criticizes the redundant and confusing terminology
of the six traditional modal adjectives—possible, impossible, neces-
sary, contingent, true, false—and second he challenges the category
of modal propositions at its root by arguing that all sentences, and
not only those of the six original varieties, are modal insofar as they
are true.32 As Lodi Nauta explains, Valla “starts with criticizing the
traditional six modal terms . . . [but] soon changes tactics and extends
the range of ‘modal’ terms to include all kinds of qualifications of verbs
such as ‘easy/difficult,’ ‘certain/uncertain,’ and ‘useful/not useful.’”33
After Valla first restricts the traditional range of modal statements
from six to one (the true), he then expands the reach of true statements
well beyond their original role and introduces “a whole new concept
of modality, which comes close to an adverbial qualification.”34 In
summary, Valla places all Aristotelian modes under the category of
true statements and explains that a claim of what is possible or neces-
sary or contingent nevertheless makes a truth claim about such possi-
bility, necessity, or contingency.
Valla’s emphasis on the truth of all kinds of modal propositions
leads him to propose the radically true nature of all arguments more
adequately describes what is in the world [and that] truth depends on accurate knowl-
edge of the world and correct representation of such knowledge” (Renaissance
Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic (Leiden: Brill,
1993), 57). For a discussion of the “true” in the Disputationes, see Nauta, In Defense of
Common Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 67–70. See also a refutation of an alleged skepticism
of theDisputationes in J. Monfasani, “Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola,” Journal of the
History of Philosophy 28 (1990): 181–200 (p. 192–198).
32For a helpful discussion of Valla’s views on modality more generally, see
Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 230–238, and Mack,
Renaissance Argument, cited in n. 31 above, p. 90, where Mack calls Valla’s treatment
“very cavalier.”
33Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 230.
34Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 232. Valla summari-
zes his new conception of modal logic in a defense against charges of heresy in his
Defensio Quaestionum in Philosophia Laurentii Vallensis, Viri Doctissimi atque
Eloquentissimi: Male dici propositiones ‘modales’ easque sex, cum sint proprie infinite, §7
(G. Zippel, L’autodifesa di Lorenzo Valla per il processo dell’inquisizione napoletana
(1444) (Padova: Antenore, 1970), 86).
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generally: a proof (probatio), which is the aim of argument (argumen-
tum), “ought to be true without qualification.”35 He ultimately conclu-
des that every argument, and not just individual propositions, must
employ true statements in all its parts:
In fact, all parts of an argument must be true, whether you say it is
‘necessary’ or ‘possible’ or ‘easy’ or ‘honorable’ or anything else.
Suppose I say ‘it is honorable that a citizen should fight for his coun-
try’: will this sentence really come under any of those modes? Not at
all. Because the case is very clear, let this one example suffice for many.
Accordingly, I think that a ‘modal’ sentence means nothing, and that
whatever weight those six modes have, the nouns or verbs that I have
mentioned have just as much; but I think that necessity and possibility
is in the conclusion, just as there is truth in all the parts of the structure
of an argument.36
Valla cannot be clearer when he asserts that a modal statement “means
nothing.”Rather than hinge his understanding of modal arguments on
careful analysis of possibility, contingency, or necessity, Valla instead
considers only the truth of such proof. As he explains earlier in his text,
“proof does not come from the false,” and here he reiterates that “there
is truth in all parts of the structure of an argument.”37
35quasi falsitas ad probationem faciat, quae vera utique debet esse, 2.19.4.
36Omnia enim sint vera oportet, sive dicas necesse est sive possibile sive facile sive
honestum sive cetera omnia. Quid enim si dicam honestum est civem pugnare pro patria:
nunquid sub aliquo illorum modorum haec erit enuntiatio? Minime. Unum pro multis in
re apertissima suffecerit exemplum. Quapropter ita sentio nihil esse enuntiationem modalem,
tantundemque momenti quantum illa sex habent, habere cetera quae dixi nomina seu verba;
sed necessitatem ac possibilitatem in conclusione esse, sicut veritatem in omnibus partibus
argumentationis, 2.19.7.
37For Valla’s claim that proof does not arise from what is false (e falso non fit pro-
batio), see Disputationes 2.19.4. Compare Quintilian’s claim that things are sometimes
proven by their opposites (12.1.35): plurima contrariis probantur. As Nauta explains,
Valla “distinguished syllogisms with certain and true premises, leading to certain
conclusions, from those syllogisms with premises that are not so certain, that is, half
true and half certain (semivera ac semicerta),” pointing to a shades of probability or
necessity in modal logic (In Defense of Common Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 233–234).
These variations in probability and necessity, Nauta further argues, reflect the three
degrees of credibility in Quintilian’s own account of proof at 5.10.16–18, but neither
Quintilian nor Valla provides a robust account of these variations. Quintilian writes
that providing an explanation of these degrees of probability and necessity “is not so
much a long task as an impossible, or rather infinite, one, and besides it is a matter
of common human understanding” (non enim longum tantum, sed etiam inpossibile ac
potius infinitum est, praeterea positum in communi omnium intellectu, 5.10.18). See also
Mack, Renaissance Argument, cited in n. 31 above, p. 80–88, where Mack details some
of peculiarities of Valla’s notions of proof and argument. Mack notes “the appearance
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Where, then, should one insert certainty? If Valla commits to an
understanding of argument where “every proof is produced through
truths that are certum, and through them, that very truth (veritas)
causes some other truth (verum), which was incertum, to be seen as
certum,” it seems paradoxical for him to advance this radical restruc-
turing of modal propositions as truth claims. To clarify Valla’s interest
in certainty, we can look to a nearby account of argumentation in the
Disputationes where Valla briefly explains the role of certainty in this
model of proof:
In this context [of modal arguments], however, ‘True’ is the same as
certum because it matters not at all that something is true unless it is
certum atque confessum. But in the first two parts of a syllogism or struc-
ture of argument, a truth is posited as certum atque confessum as such. In
the last part, however—in the conclusion—the truth is extracted by
force (extorquetur), and thus it has necessity, or a sort of necessity.38
In this explanation of logical premises and their conclusions, Valla
uses legal language to reformulate dialectical reasoning as a concern
of the lawyer’s courtroom rather than the philosopher’s study, and
more specifically, he shows again how he understands certainty as a
concept centered around agreement, and particularly an agreement
of a forensic orientation. The first two parts of an argument—that is,
its two premises—are already confessa, and Valla’s use of confiteor,
a verb closely associated with the world of criminal action, imbues
his description of the syllogism with an air of forensic strategy.39
Valla’s legally tinged terminology here extends also to the third part
of the argument—the conclusion—where the truth must be
of three different terms which may be thought to overlap to some extent: true, agreed
and necessary” (p. 82).
38Idem autem est hoc loco verum quod certum, quia nihil attinet esse quid verum nisi
fuerit certum atque confessum. Sed veritas duarum priorum syllogismi argumentationisque
partium, pro certa atque confessa ponitur. In ultima autem–idest in conclusione–extorquetur,
ideoque necessitas inest sive tanquam necessitas, 2.19.8. The most recent I Tatti translation
renders nihil attinet esse quid verum as “nothing gets to be true.” I choose to render atti-
net as an impersonal verb with an accusative and infinitive verb, as recommended at
OLD attineo 7c. For a brief commentary on this passage, see Nauta, In Defense of
Common Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 234.
39For the legal dimension of confiteor, see wide-ranging examples from Plautus
and Terence through Statius and Tacitus at OLD 1a, 1c and TLL vol. IV 226, 55sqq.
For examples of confessus as a synonym of manifestus, the word used as a synonym
for certum in the Elegantiae, see TLL vol. IV 232, 44sqq. Nauta explains that certum atque
confessum amounts to “an almost pragmatic definition of truth that, fully in line with
the rhetorician’s understanding of truth, had been formulated by Aristotle in his
Rhetoric and restated by Cicero and Quintilian” (In Defense of Common Sense, cited in
n. 4 above, p. 233).
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“extracted” (extorquetur), recalling the gathering of evidence “by forc-
ible argument” or even by dislocating joints and torturing on the
rack.40 Valla’s use of extorqueo also recalls methods of gathering of evi-
dence that Quintilian himself considers in his discussions of inartificial
proofs: as Valla’s model for his work, Quintilian describes how an
expert interrogator can “extort (extorquere) from a witness what he
did not want to say.”41 Our humanist reformer thus reinforces that
rational arguments are dependent on the language of legal procedure,
even in the context of philosophical dialectic.42
More fundamentally, the lexical composition of the word confes-
sum reminds readers that certainty arises from interactionswith others.
The verb confiteri means not merely to fess up, but to confess. Its first
lexical component, con-, suggests that certainty does not arise privately
through meditation in one’s library but rather through the admissions
and acknowledgments that come about through adversarial question-
ing. To extract a confession, so the Disputationes implies, involves gen-
erating agreement with some other person, not merely with oneself.43
Like Valla’s recollection of the consuetudo of Julianus and his coupling
of certum and constitutum in the Elegantiae, this paradigm of argumen-
tation in theDisputationes yet again reinforces the “togetherness” at the
root of Valla’s understanding of certainty and its usefulness for discov-
ering truths.44
40See OLD extorqueo 2, 3 and TLL vol. V 2, 2043, 60sqq.
41At in eo qui verum invitus dicturus est, prima felicitas interrogantis extorquere quod
is noluerit. . . . Respondebit enim quae nocere causae non arbitrabitur, ex pluribus deinde quae
confessus erit eo perducetur ut quod dicere non vult negare non possit, 5.7.17. Note, too, the
appearance of confessus. See Quintilian’s similar use of extorqueo at 5.7.27.
42Nauta also underscores the forensic nature of Valla’s approach: “The orator
may use syllogism, but since his task is to plead rather than to seek the truth, he must
employ the full range of his verbal skills to attract and convince the jury and the audi-
ence, who often are ignorant of the fine points of dialectic” (In Defense of Common
Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 235).
43Framing argumentation around agreements, perhaps to Valla’s disappoint-
ment, might be traced to the view of dialectic in Aristotle, who explains that only sci-
entific demonstration uses premises that are “primary and true” whereas dialectical
argument uses endoxa, premises that are “reputable” and in many cases “agreed
upon.” See Topica 100a25–30 and 100b21–23. For a recent discussion of the role of
endoxa in argument, see D. Frede, “The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are And
What They Are Not,” in B. Inwood, ed., Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 185–214. Nauta also points to the legal
underpinnings of Valla’s explanation here (In Defense of Common Sense, cited in n. 4
above, p. 233).
44Valla’s metaphor of argumentation as a forensic procedure aimed at forming
consensus is perhaps at odds with a later military metaphor where Valla explains
how “when two of us dispute with one another, we are not really enemies, as those
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TheDisputationes, like the Elegantiae and the marginal commentary
on the Institutio, shows again how Valla understands certainty through
the forensic agreements that ground Quintilian’s own account of cer-
tum. Not merely an explanation of an ancient rhetorical treatise or a
clarification of its terminology, however, Valla’s “retilling” of scholasti-
cism shows how the humanist was eager to use Quintilian’s notion of
certainty in his own innovative writings on a reformed humanist dia-
lectic or perhaps even a proto-“social epistemology.”45 And as we shall
see now, Valla’s pervasive coupling of certum with the vocabulary of
agreement—constitutum, consuetudo, consensus, confessum—adumbrates
his reformulations of a variety of legal concepts including natural and
conventional laws. Valla’s jurisprudential writings, in fact, clarify the
role of agreements in dialectic by showing how reason itself manifests
in the consensus underpinning both ius gentium and ius naturale.
III. THE HUMANIST LAW OF AGREEMENT
As we have already seen in Valla’s citation of Julianus in the mar-
gins of the Institutio, Valla was familiar with at least one ancient discus-
sion of how laws can be derived from common practice or local
conventions, whether enacted through consuetudo or dissolved through
desuetudo. Just as Valla’s commentary on Quintilian’s text presents two
sources for the law—a written statute or a community’s “very acts and
deeds”—his account of leges in the Elegantiae similarly points to the
importance of popular support in grounding civil law:
Laws come from either a prince or a free people. Those which are esta-
blished by a king do not require the consensus of one other person.
There are those which are brought to the people and which are not
really ratified without the people’s decree, because the public is accus-
tomed to being asked, or rather interrogated, about them. These laws
are called rogationes.46
people are when they fight; both of us soldier under the same commander—the
Truth” (non enim hostes inter nos sumus cum disputamus, ut illi cum pugnant; sed sub
eodem imperatore—quae est Veritas—utrique militamus, 3.pr.1). On this metaphor, see
Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 239.
45For an introductory account of the modern study of “social epistemology,” in
which “veritistic” group practices might be effective “from a truth-acquisitional point
of view,” see A. I. Goldman, “Social Epistemology,” Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana
de Filosofía 31 (1999): 3–19.
46Sunt igitur leges aut principis, aut liberi populi. Quae a rege conduntur, alterius
consensum non requirunt; quae ad populum feruntur, quaeque sine eius iussu fere ratae
non sunt, quia rogari, id est, interrogari de his populus solet, rogationes etiam dicuntur, 4.48.
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Valla’s capacious understanding of leges here includes not only laws
that are imposed upon the population by a ruler (a rege), but also those
which are validated by the people’s agreement. At one extreme, a law
enacted by an autocrat requires no consensus, not even of “one other
person.”At the other extreme, however, laws that are enacted through
a rogatio “are not really ratified without the people’s decree.”47 Valla’s
citation of Julianus and his brief commentary on leges in the Elegantiae
here anticipate a more robust defense of consensus-based laws in his
extensive commentary on Quintilian’s text. In those annotations, Valla
rejects natural law (ius naturale) in favor of laws grounded in broad
agreements, and he lays out a theory of laws rooted in the conventions
of certainty, demonstrating yet again his adoption of Quintilian’s
notion of certum as agreement and reinforcing a view of reasoning
itself as a process of generating consensus.
In the second book of the Institutio, Quintilian suggests that there
are three categories of law: the sacred, the public, and the private.48
In his marginal commentary on this passage, Valla first notes the supe-
riority of Quintilian’s formulation to that found in the Digest—Melior
hec divisio quam est illa in Digestis—and then includes a long citation
from the jurist Ulpian, a defender of ius naturale, as a foil for
Quintilian’s view.49 Of great interest to Valla is Ulpian’s distinction
between natural law (ius naturale) and the law of nations (ius gentium),
a separation that Ulpian explains as follows:
Natural law (ius naturale) is what nature has taught to all animals. For
that kind of law is not only the property of the human race, but of all
47The final clause of Valla’s explanation references the rogatio, a legislative proce-
dure dating to the Roman Republic that involved a Roman magistrate proposing leg-
islation as a question to a Roman assembly. After the requisite period of three days
reserved for debate (trinundium), the assembly would reconvene to answer the ques-
tion with a ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ either passing or rejecting the law (OCD lex).
48nam et genera sunt tria sacri, publici, privati iuris, 2.4.33. Cesarini Martinelli and
Perosa call Valla’s notes on this section of the Institutio the “pearl” of the entire man-
uscript (Le Postille all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5 above, p. lxxxii).
49Ulpian writes that there are only two kinds of law, the public and the private,
where public law is further divided into laws pertaining to sacred rites (in sacris), those
pertaining to priests (in sacerdotibus), and those pertaining to civil officers (in magistrati-
bus). Ulpian similarly divides private laws into three categories: natural laws (ex naturali-
bus praeceptis), laws of different nations (ex praeceptis gentium), and civil laws (ex praeceptis
civilibus): Huius studii due sunt positiones, publica et privata. Publicum ius est quod statum rei
publice Romane spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem: sunt enim quedam publice uti-
lia, quedam privatim. Publicum ius in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit. Privatum
ius tripartitum est: collectum enim est ex naturalibus preceptis aut gentium aut civilibus, at
Institutio 2.4.33 (Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa, Le Postille all’“Institutio Oratoria” di
Quintiliano, cited in n. 5 above, p. 56–57).
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animals, including those born both on land and in the sea. And it is
shared with birds, too. The joining of male and female derives from this
law, which we ourselves call matrimony. And the procreation of chil-
dren comes from this law. Indeed, we see that other animals, even wild
animals, have experience with this kind of law. The law of nations (ius
gentium) is that which human nations use. And one is allowed to
understand that the law of nations is separate from natural law since
the latter pertains to all animals, whereas the law of nations is common
only among men.50
In a pointed critique of Ulpian’s separation of ius naturale and ius gen-
tium, Valla rejects the notion that law can ever be natural, arguing that
the existence of any law among “beasts” is even more absurd than
Ulpian’s claim that the law of nations is a kind of private law.51 In con-
trast to Ulpian’s description of ius naturale as a law that pertains to all
living creatures and their mating and procreation, Valla defines law as a
uniquely human institution: “nature is one thing, and the law is another,
andwhatever animals do, undoubtedly they do through nature.”52
50Ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam ius istud non solum
humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalium, que in terra, que in mari nascuntur;
aviumquoque commune est. Hinc descendit maris et femine coniugatio, quam nos matrimo-
nium appellamus; hinc liberorum procreatio; videmus enim cetera animalia, feras etiam, istius
iurus [peritia] censeri. Ius gentium est quo gentes humane utuntur. Quod a naturali recedere
facile intellegere licet, quia illud omnibus animalibus, hoc solis hominibus inter se commune
sit, at Institutio 1.4.33 (Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa, Le Postille all’“Institutio
Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5 above, p. 57). Valla’s manuscript uses the noun
peritia (practical knowledge or skill) instead of the adjective perita (skilled or expert),
but I have emended the text to use the predicate adjective after censeri in agreement
with animalia. The noun peritia would effect the sense of animals being considered a
skill itself rather than skillful.
51Nam quod bestias etiam complexus est, ut dicat “ius naturale,” hoc absurdius est
quam id quod modo peccavit, at Institutio 2.4.33 (Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa, Le
Postille all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5 above, p. 57–58).
52Aliud est enim natura, aliud ius, et quicquid animalia faciunt, haud dubie natura
faciunt, at Institutio 2.4.33 (Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa, Le Postille all’“Institutio
Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5 above, p. 58). In this edition’s introduction,
Martinelli postulates that this difference hinges on Valla’s understanding of choice
as a uniquely human capability: “The concept of justice, which involves the freedom
of choice, is proper only to mankind. And animals defend themselves from violence,
but ‘whatever happens justly or unjustly pertains only to men’” (p. lxxxiii). Valla
emphasizes his distaste for the term ius naturale in the Elegantiae, too, by drawing
contrasts between the behavior of men and the behavior of animals. In a chapter titled
Aliud leges esse, aliud iura, he explains that “it is ridiculous to speak of ius naturale,
which nature teaches to all animals. An instinctive desire to mate and even for harm-
ing, plundering, and killing a weaker animal—who says this is ius? And so Cicero in
his books on duties was silent about the natural law, illustrating that there is ius only
among humans, and that is the ius gentium or the ius civilium” (Nam ius naturale dicere,
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Valla’s emphatic separation of law and nature here sets the stage
for a notion of conventional or positive law, and in his continued criti-
cism of Ulpian, Valla insists that laws arise from human agreements
rather than any natural guidelines that exist independent of human
activity. Valla illustrates his interest in such agreements by appealing
to a perplexing requirement of consistency among all iura whereby a
nation should not be able to enact a ius gentium that contradicts the
putative ius naturale. By adopting Ulpian’s notion of natural law, so
Valla insists, such contradictions would appear:
That which all nations consider just—since nature is their guide—and
about which one nation does not differ from another, let us call that
one kind of law. And that which nations or peoples individually have
deemed to be just on their own, let us call that another kind, at least
regarding its appearance. For if it were the case, as Ulpian says, that
all men are born free by natural law but become slaves by the law of
nations, it would not be called the law of nations but rather injustice
(iniuria). And this would likewise be the case if some nation wished
to have a law for taking a cow as a wife: because if this law of marrying
a cow is the ius, then that first notion of a ius naturale is not ius at all.
Indeed, it is not possible for the law to be contrary to the law (neque
enim potest ius iuri esse contrarium).53
Valla views iura as a single set of rules that must be internally con-
sistent—“it is not possible for the law to be contrary to the law”—
but he then illustrates the contradictions in contemporary thought
concerning slavery: men are born free according to natural law, but
through the law of nations, they are made slaves.54 To strengthen his
case, Valla then invokes a derisive hypothetical scenario: that a nation,
against the principles of Ulpian’s alleged ius naturale, might sanction
quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ridiculum est. Appetitum coeundi atque adeo nocendi
imbecilliori animali, spoliandi, occidendi, quis ius esse dixerit? Ideoque M. Tullius in libris
officiorum de iure naturali silentium egit inter solos homines ius esse significans, idque
Gentium esse vel Civilium, 4.48).
53Quod enim omnes gentes iustum sentiunt natura duce, nec alia ab alia differunt, id
unum genus iuris existimememus, alterum, huius nimirum speciem, quod singule gentes
populive privatim iustum esse decreverunt. Nam quod ait Ulpianus, omnes nasci liberos
naturali iure, sed iure gentium servos fieri, si ita esset, non ius gentium, sed iniuria appel-
labitur, perinde ac si vellet aliqua gens ius esse vaccam ducendi uxorem; quod si hoc ius est,
illud ius non erit: neque enim potest ius iuri esse contrarium, at Institutio 2.4.33 (Cesarini
Martinelli and Perosa, Le Postille all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5
above, p. 58)
54Valla calls this contradiction between the two laws iniuria, often translated as
“injustice” as I have done here. One might also think of the term as what contradicts
ius, an “unlawfulness” or even “anti-lawfulness.”
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human-bovine matrimony.55 Remaining committed to the axiom that
one ius cannot contradict another, Valla rejects a ius naturale that might
run counter to the agreements and conventions of any particular juris-
diction, and whatever “nations or peoples (gentes populive) individu-
ally have deemed just on their own” must stand as a kind of ius on
equal footing with natural law. Rather than define two independent
sets of law or define some method of adjudicating conflicts between
positive and natural laws, Valla instead insists on “nations or peoples”
as the source of legal authority, and since the notion of ius naturale runs
counter to this authority, Valla rejects it entirely.
Valla’s detailed critique of Ulpian’s natural law serves as a prelude
to his central jurisprudential claim found in his comments alongside
Book 2 of the Institutio, a claim which itself is taken from another
passage of Quintilian: “all justice rests either upon nature or upon
convention (natura vel constitutione).”56 At first glance, it seems coun-
terproductive for Valla to appeal to Quintilian’s principle, for this
ancient maxim unambiguously cites natura as a foundation for justice,
and Valla has just excoriated Ulpian’s theory of a ius naturale. Valla’s
understanding of the law rooted in nature or convention, however,
seems to understand the word “or” (vel) with only a weakly disjunc-
tive force: laws must be rooted in either nature or convention, and in
all likelihood in some combination of the two. Turning once more to
the Elegantiae, we find that Valla’s conception of natura, in fact, is not
identified with an abstract ius naturale but instead is coupled with
55Immediately following his principle of non-contradiction among iura, Valla
comments briefly on Quintilian’s third category of laws, sacred law: “natural law, if it
differs from the law of nations, can be called the divine law or sacred law” (cum presertim
ius naturale, si quid a gentium differt, possit appellari ius divinum aut ius sacrum). His discus-
sion of sacred law is unclear, and Martinelli and Perosa note that Valla may simply use
ius divinum as another phrase for ius naturale, as he seems to do in his commentary on
Institutio 2.4.33 (Le Postille all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5 above,
p. lxxxiv). There is a similar kinship between ius divinum and ius naturale in the
Elegantiae, for in his discussion concerning leges and ius, Valla writes that Cicero “never-
theless referred to the ius naturale in his rhetorical works, but that which pertains only
to mankind; he meant that there were six kinds of this law: religio, pietas, gratia, vindi-
catio, observantia, veritas” (In rhetoricis tamen ius naturale statuit, sed quod in homines
tantummodo cadat; cuius species sex esse voluit, religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicatio-
nem, observantiam, veritatem, 4.48). For a more thorough discussion of the inconsisten-
cies in Valla’s use of ius divinum, see Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa, Le Postille
all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5 above, p. lxxxiii–lxxxvi.
56iustum omne continetur natura vel constitutione, 7.4.5. Valla cites this passage
from the Institutio as part of his commentary of the Institutio at 2.4.33 (Cesarini
Martinelli and Perosa, Le Postille all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5
above, p. 58); however, he does not comment on this passage of the Institutio where
it appears in Book 7.
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human agreements, a coupling he expresses in a long chain of verbal
phrases:
That which was established through the custom of ancestors was thus
established through laws and was settled through laws (legibus ita consti-
tutum est). And that was thus established through nature, and was thus
settled through nature (ita natura constitutum est), andwas thus prescribed
by nature (ita natura praescriptum). And that thing which nature herself
prescribed to us, it was given to us through nature, just as we give aid
to those who are in danger. Reason itself (ratio ipsa) commands this to
us, and it thus seems that reason dictates it.57
Cumbersome though they may be, these clauses show how customs
and laws can themselves be “settled through nature” (natura constitu-
tum est), a brief phrase that intertwines the conventional and natural
dimensions of law, the ius naturale and ius gentium. Underlying Valla’s
rendering here of natura, moreover, is ratio, the rational faculty that gui-
des not just nature but even mankind’s formation of its own laws and
customs. In other words, Valla understands that what is constitutum
within human society is a manifestation of natura’s effects in reasoned
human activity. These customs and agreements, so Valla argues here,
are not legal instruments counter to or even independent of nature’s
dictates.
Valla reiterates his understanding of the natural, rational basis of
law and its close ties with human legal agreements in his commentary
on the Institutio, where he writes that conventional laws are natural
insofar as they stem from the reason common to all men: “what natural
reason (naturalis ratio) has established (constituit) among all people is
rightly preserved and called the ius gentium among all nations, since it
is the law which all nations use.”58 By orienting the ius gentium around
a universally shared natural reason (gentes omnes utuntur), Valla blurs
the distinction between natural law and the law of nations. Natural
laws, at least as Valla understands them, do not descend from heaven
but rather arise from humanity. For the purposes of the present study,
too, this intertwining of natural and positive law illustrates yet
again Valla’s blending of rational and rhetorical concepts through
57More maiorum comparatum est, legibus ita comparatum est, legibus ita constitutum
est, ita natura comparatum est, ita natura constitutum est, ita natura praescriptum, hoc nobis
ipsa natura praescribit, nobis natura datum est, ut periclitantes allevemus. hoc ratio ipsa prae-
scribit, ita videtur ratio dictare, 3.78 (3.89 in Garin).
58Quod autem naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes gentes pereque
custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, cum quo iure gentes omnes utuntur (Cesarini Martinelli
and Perosa, Le Postille all’“Institutio Oratoria” di Quintiliano, cited in n. 5 above, p. 59).
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now-familiar terminology. Valla’s use of constituit in his explana-
tion of the essence and origin of the ius gentium recalls the several
words throughout his discussion of certainty that rely on the same
Latin prefix to denote various agreements: consuetudo, confessum,
consensus. Just as Valla readily combines conventional laws with
the naturalis ratio in jurisprudence, his refashioning of dialectic in
the Disputationes combines the logical cogency of syllogistic forms
and rhetorical elements of persuasion and shared belief. These discus-
sions of jurisprudence, then, bolster our understanding of Valla’s pro-
gram of “rhetoricization” in the Disputationes by calling our attention
once more to his careful use of the vocabulary of agreements even in
discussions of natural reason.
IV. CONCLUSION
It bears repeating that Valla’s reliance on rhetorical texts in general
andQuintilian’s text in particular is not a novel claim in the study of this
Italian humanist. What the present investigation clarifies is the influ-
ence of Quintilian’s text in Valla’s understanding of certainty and
how this particularly forensic orientation of certum and related vocabu-
lary persists throughout his many works.59 By pairing ratio with forms
of the verb constituo throughout his legal discussions and by positioning
certainty centrally in his reformed conception of modal logic, Valla’s
works coherently and consistently apply the terminology of certainty
he provides in his Elegantiae. In that lexicographical treatment, where
Valla suggests not just that one should turn to Quintilian to understand
this concept but more particularly that one should refer to Quintilian’s
discussion of status theory, we find Valla’s most explicit connections
between certum and the rhetorical concerns surrounding consensus.
By eschewing Quintilian’s most explicit discussion of certum in Book 5
and instead pointing his readers to Book 3, Valla suggests that the
concept of certainty is most closely associated with those ancient inven-
tional questions of forensic oratory: an sit? quid sit? quale sit?60
59Nauta briefly mentions Valla’s awareness of Quintilian’s discussion of certum
in the Institutio in his study of the Disputationes (In Defense of Common Sense, cited in
n. 4 above, p. 234). I have shown that Valla’s use of Quintilian’s notion of certainty
extends throughout several of his writings and that Valla’s association of certum with
a number of other words denoting agreement persists in these various works.
60For status theory considered as a “doctrine of inquiry” around these three
questions, see M. Carter, “Stasis and Kairos: Principles of Social Construction in
Classical Rhetoric,” Rhetoric Review 7:1 (1988): 97–112.
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In fact, Valla’s lexicographical investigation implies what is stated
explicitly in the Disputationes, where Valla relies on his understanding
of certainty to repackage the strategies and language of status theory—
originally fit for the law courts—for use in dialectical argument61:
Every proof is produced through truths that are certum, and, through
them, that very truth causes some other truth, which was incertum, to be
seen as certum, and this happens either necessarily or plausibly. There
are, however, three ways for a truth to be incertum since, according to
some of the greatest authorities, our doubts are of three kinds: whether
something is; what that something or anything is; and what it is like.62
Valla’s close integration of the syllogism and status theory reformula-
tes dialectic in terms of the agreements and disagreements of forensic
rhetoric, and his understanding of what is incertum as what is unset-
tled shows howdisputes, both dialectical and rhetorical, can be catego-
rized according to the three “doubts” in traditional renderings of
status theory. The goal of argumentation, then, is to resolve disagree-
ments about what is doubtful, and by using what is already certum
atque confessum, proof tries to make certum a true but controversial or
doubtful conclusion. Certainty, therefore, occupies a central role in
both the beginning and the end of logical arguments: in the collection
of premises that are agreed upon and finally in the resolution of dis-
agreements in the argument’s conclusion, a conclusion that eventually
becomes confessum, constitutum, and certum.
Valla’s project is simultaneously one of simplification as well as
one of audacious broadening. He discards complex Aristotelian termi-
nology and paradigms in favor of a simpler triad of questions, but as
Valla closes his discussion of modal logic, he notes that status theory
should be applied not merely to forensic disputes and philosophical
proofs but also to matters from a wide variety of intellectual discipli-
nes. He argues that “every problem—whether within the law or
outside the law, whether within philosophy or outside philosophy—
derives from these questions.”63 It should therefore not surprise us that
61Nauta makes note of the appearance of status theory in the Disputationes and
Valla’s debt to Quintilian in his understanding of this ancient framework (In Defense
of Common Sense, cited in n. 4 above, p. 235–236).
62Probatio omnis fit per vera quae certa sunt, facitque per haec ipsa veritas aliud quod-
dam verum videri certum quod erat incertum, idque vel necessario vel verisimiliter. Est autem
verum incertum triplici via quia, ut maximis quibusdam auctoribus placuit, tripliciter dubi-
tamus: aut an quippiam sit; aut quid illud quippiam sive aliquid sit; aut quale sit ipsum ali-
quid, 2.19.22.
63ex quibus omnis quaestio—sive in iure sive extra ius, sive in philosophia sive extra
philosophiam—pendet, 2.19.24.
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this terminology of certainty extends well beyond Valla’s technical
discussions of scholasticism. In fact, Valla defends this expansive
approach by appealing once more to the lessons of his favorite
Roman model, Quintilian. He concludes that “in each kind of
inquiry—rational, moral, natural, and many others—our practice
is to ask whether it is, what it is, and what it is like, which is almost
explicit in the words of Quintilian.”64 For Valla, then, Quintilian is
the prime inspiration for turning philosophy and legal theory (and
indeed any branch of intellectual activity) into a forensic investiga-
tion centered around status theory, a framework that takes the cer-
tainty of consensus as both its material and its aim.
64praeterea in singulis—rationali, morali, naturali, et sique sint alia—quaerere solemus an
sit, quid sit, quale sit, ut propemodum ex Quintiliani verbis palam est, 2.19.25. In support of
this expansive understanding of status theory, Valla cites Boethius on the unity of ratio-
nal, moral, and natural investigations: omnis quaestio vel ex ratione disserendi vel ex naturali
vel ex morali trahitur speculatione (De topicis differentiis 1.5.50, Patrologia Latina 64:1180A).
Regarding this wide application of status theory, Quintilian himself takes inspiration
from Cicero: “Most writers offer us three general issues. Cicero adopts these in the
Orator, and thinks they embrace everything which comes into dispute or contention.
They are: Does it exist? What is it? What sort of thing is it?” (a plurimis tres sunt facti gene-
rales status, quibus et Cicero in Oratore utitur et omnia quae aut in controversiam aut in conten-
tionem veniant contineri putat: sitne, quid sit, quale sit, 3.6.44).
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